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WE CAN'T ARGUE FOREVER
BY KATA BOGNÁR AND LONES SMITH
Abstract
We analyze time-costly decision-making in committees by privately
informed individuals, such as juries, panels, boards, etc. In the spirit
of the Coase Conjecture, we show that the decision is ￿almost
instantaneous￿when individuals entertain identical objectives. Delay
can only be understood as the outcome of conflicting (biased)
objectives.
Összefoglaló
A cikkben egy bizottsÆg d￿ntØshozÆsi mechanizmusÆt elemezz￿k nem
teljes informÆci￿ esetØn. Alapvető feltevØs￿nk, hogy a bizottsÆgi tagok
privÆt informÆci￿val rendelkeznek a d￿ntØs helyessØgØt illetően, vala-
mint hogy a folyamat procedurÆlis k￿ltsØget igØnyel, pontosabban
sz￿lva a tagoknak nem csak a helyes d￿ntØs, hanem egyœttal a gyors
d￿ntØs is ØrdekØben Æll. A modell le￿rja tanÆcsad￿ test￿letek, orvos Øs
egyØb szakØrtői csoportok műk￿dØsØt, valamint jellemzi az amerikai
igazsÆgszolgÆltatÆsban nagy jelentősØggel b￿r￿ esk￿dtszØkek d￿ntØs-
hozÆsi mechanizmusÆt. Megmutatjuk, hogy a t￿kØletesen egyező Ørde-
kek egy bizottsÆgban majdhogynem azonnali d￿ntØst eredmØnyeznek.
K￿vetkeztetØs￿nk, hogy a val￿sÆgban megfigyelhető kØsleltetett d￿ntØs
magyarÆzatÆhoz eltØrő Ørdekek feltØtelezØse sz￿ksØges.1 INTRODUCTION
Decision-making in committees is quite common, e.g. juries, tenure cases,
board of directors, professional panels of doctors or other experts. The
purpose of deliberation is to aggregate the members' private information. In
this paper we focus for simplicity on binary decisions (e.g. guilty or not
guilty). One critical aspect of joint decision making we emphasize is its time
cost.
We assume that individuals wish to make the best decision possible in the
least time possible, but are unable to simply put their private information „on
the table” as it were. (For example, in a group of experts in different fields
understanding can be difficult due to different terminology.) That is, we wish
to analyze costly committee decision-making by like-minded individuals. We
assume in particular that individuals can only communicate their information
by how and when they vote.
One stylized fact about joint decision-making is that the ultimate decision
may be quite delayed. The classic movie „Twelve Angry Men” highlights this
fact for jury decisions. In fact, the voting procedure in that film resembles the
one that we adopt. We assume that every period a vote is taken, and the game
ends with unanimity. For simplicity, we focus on just two-member panels. We
show that contrary to the outcome of the movie, decision making should be
quite fast, if in fact the jurors were only „interested in the truth”.
Our main result has the flavor of the Coase Conjecture.
1 If the time interval
between votes diminishes, the probability that the final decision is realized in
any given real time tends to 1. This paper thus suggests that it is impossible to
reconcile delay in committee decision-making with rational, like-minded
individuals. Further, it is clear that this result obtains despite our exclusion of
all forms of non-voting communication. The only way to understand delay is
by assuming that jury members entertain con°icting objectives. While the
                    
1 See Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986).2
movie has raced bias as a clear subtext, our result suggests that incoherent
preferences invariably must lie at the heart of any observed delay.
Related literature. The paper relates to the work by Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998) and also by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Coughlan
(2000) and Duggan and Martinelli (2001) on voting rules in juries. Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998) describe the decision making as one-round hence
costless voting; they assume strategic behavior and show that the equilibrium
outcome with unanimity rule is actually worse than the one with majority rule
from a welfare point of view. Since the jurors are like-minded in this model,
their result emphasizes the deficiency of aggregating information with
unanimity rule.
A sequel of this literature by Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002b), (2002a)
provides parallel inferiority of unanimity rule even if some debate is allowed
before the actually voting. In their setup pre-voting communication does not
influence the outcome of the voting directly and cost-less. On the contrary, we
see the deliberation as repeated voting where the process can end in any
round. Hence, we assume less about the possible message space and also we
perform the analysis with more general informational structure.
Our model is related to ’Agreeing to Disagree’ results as well. Aumann (1976)
showed that if two people share the same prior, and if their posteriors are
common knowledge, then those posteriors must coincide. Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982) raises the issue of sequential communication of these
posteriors. They show that this leads to the same beliefs in finitely many steps.
Their result relies on the assumption that information is described by a finite
partition of an underlying state space. By contrast, we make no restriction of
the information partition, and do not allow agents to fully communicate their
posteriors. Rather, the votes serve to communicate a binary signal of the
posterior. Still, while our stages may last arbitrarily long, we do achieve an
arbitrarily fast real-time agreement.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we describe the
model, in Section 3 we show that equilibrium exists and finally Section 4 is
about the ’collapsing’ nature of the equilibrium. Section 5 concludes the
paper.2 The Model
In the following we will use juries as an example. We ¯rst describe the informational structure
of the game and then we give the timing of the play as well as strategies and ¯nally we de¯ne
the payo®s.
Information. There are two states of the world (µ): the defendant is either guilty (G) or
innocent (I) and the prior belief of G is 0:5. Both jurors have some private information about
the state of the world that is represented by a one-dimensional signal. We can `skip' the updating
phase and can summarize that private information immediately by p, the private posterior of
the juror about state G. These posteriors are conditionally iid drawn from F(pjµ) with common
support co(supp(F)) = [p;p] µ [0;1] for µ = G;I2. We also assume that there is no perfectly
revealing signal. Furthermore, all these assumptions are common knowledge among the players.
In what follows we refer to the type of a juror as p. As it is usual, in the literature we make the
following assumptions about the underlying structure of information. First, the densities f(pjµ)
exist and are bounded away from zero and in¯nity whenever p 2 (0;1). Second, to represent
the complementarity amongst private information we assume that the signal distribution has
the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)3. Also assume that the likelihood ratio is
continuously di®erentiable.
Timing and Strategies. We consider an alternating move game.4 Initially (at time zero), one
of the juror decide on either conviction (C) or acquittal (A). In the next period the other has
the right to agree or disagree; an agreement ends the game with the obvious verdict. In case of
disagreement the ¯rst juror talks again; she either agrees with the other (changes her opinion) or
disagrees, etc. We also assume a strictly positive °ow cost of being in the decision process. Our
intuition is that the less certain a juror originally is about the defendant's status, the earlier she
is willing to change her mind during the decision process. A strategy of player 1 has the form
(d;¿1
D) and for player 2 (¿2
D) where d : [p;p] ! fA;Cg describes the `¯rst' player's choice and
¿i
D : [p;p] ! N where D 2 fA;Cg, gives the stopping time if the ¯rst choice is D.
Payo®s. Both jurors have a common interest in making the right decision, i.e. convict if the
defendant is guilty and acquit if the defendant is innocent. As it is common in the literature, we
normalize the payo® in case of good decision to zero while convicting an innocent costs q and
acquitting a guilty costs (1 ¡ q) for both jurors. Formally, u(CjG) = u(AjI) = 0, u(CjI) = ¡q
and u(AjG) = ¡(1 ¡ q), and we refer them as terminal costs. We also have a positive decision
2Notice that F(:) has to satisfy an extra so-called no introspection condition.
3This property often called a±liation in the auction literature.
4Allowing simultaneous moves is the subject of current research. The ¯rst formalization was a mixture of the
two, so that at time zero there is a vote held and both jurors decide on either conviction or acquittal. In case of
disagreement the jurors are involved in an alternating move game.
3cost that is c per unit of time or ¢c per time period where the length of the period is ¢. We
choose unit cost since it is more intuitive here, on a relatively small time horizon than discounting.
Finally, jurors are risk neutral and cost minimizing, so the `preferred' verdict for a juror with
low posterior is A and for a juror with high posterior is C.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Description
We wish to show that in committee decisions with like-minded individuals there is no delay (there
is no delay in the ¯nal subgame) in real time if the period length is vanishing. Our intuition
in this setup is that jurors with more extreme signals will wait longer before giving in. Notice
that the jurors are facing a tradeo® between acquiring information about the opponent's signal
that helps their decision and paying the cost of the decision making. We think that due to the
a±liated information structure, a juror with more extreme signal will valuate this information
higher and so is willing to `pay' more for it. Indeed we show that equilibrium exists and it is
necessarily monotone.
First, we show that each player's best response is monotone. Results of this °avor usually
follow from the single crossing property of the payo® function in action and type. We can phrase
this property more intuitively: if players are arranged according their types then a player `weakly
prefers' an action to an other one implies that anyone with `higher' type must strictly prefer the
same action.
This is not quite obvious in our story. Consider a case when a juror prefers to stop at n + 2
over stopping at n, i.e. her expected payo® increases by switching from n to n+2. By doing this,
she changes the outcome of the voting with some probability and by assumption that change is
favorable for her. On one hand, the same change in the outcome is more `valuable' for a more
extreme juror; on the other hand she might ¯nd it less likely that the change actually happens.
Therefore, the overall e®ect is unclear. Fortunately, on balance we found a favorable e®ect.
The monotonicity of best response implies that all equilibria, if any, are necessarily monotone.
Finally, we prove the existence of monotone equilibria. The best response is single valued and
continuous what allows us to apply a ¯xed-point theorem.
3.2 Monotonicity
To characterize equilibria the following notation is useful. First, x (respectively y) is a proxy
for the type of an A-juror (respectively C-juror). Second, given realizations x;y, the posterior of




4where `(p) is he likelihood ratio f(pjI)=f(pjG). The expected terminal costs from a verdict
are vA(x;y) = (1 ¡ q)½(x;y) and vC(x;y) = q(1 ¡ ½(x;y)). In case of acquittal, the decision is
appropriate and induces no costs if the defendant is innocent but costs 1 ¡ q if the defendant is
guilty, an event that occurs with probability ½(x;y). In case of conviction, the decision is right
if the defendant is guilty, but costs q if the defendant is innocent, that happens with probability
1¡½(x;y). Finally, with some some abuse of notation F(xjy) and F(yjx) denote the conditional
distributions5. Also, to handle alternating moves, we introduce the following de¯nition: let
NA = fnjA-juror movesg and NC = fnjC-juror movesg.
Before we proceed we wish to emphasize some `regularity properties' of the signal distribu-
tion and the posterior, those are straight consequences of the underlying informational structure.
First, the posterior ½(x;y) is monotone increasing in both arguments. This result is quite intu-
itive, the higher is the private signal, the higher is the posterior of guilt holding the opponent's
signal realization constant. Second, the posterior has ¯nite ¯rst derivatives whenever x;y 2 (0;1)
And ¯nally, the `conditional' density f(ajb) is bounded away from zero and in¯nity whenever
a;b 2 (0;1).
Recall that a strategy assigns an integer to each of the continuum possible types. Therefore,
any strategy de¯nes a set structure on the type space that we can characterize in the following way.
Given a strategy ¿A, let Â(n) = fxj¿A(x) = ng and Â+(n) = fxj¿A(x) > ng, i.e. all the types x 2
Â(n) are stopping at n and also all the types x 2 Â+(n) are holding out longer than n according
to the strategy at hand. Similarly, for ¿C, let ¸(n) = fyj¿C(y) = ng and ¸+(n) = fyj¿C(y) > ng.
Using the notation above we can formalize the expected cost for a C-juror with posterior y










Assume that the opponent has a private posterior x then ¿A and n together determines the
verdict. If that particular x stops before n then the verdict is conviction what leads to terminal
costs vC(x;y) and decision costs ¿A(x). Hence, the ¯rst part of the expression above refers to
states when the opponent gives in earlier so the verdict is conviction and the decision cost is
determined by the stopping time of the A-juror. The second part gives the expected costs if
the opponent gives in later so the verdict is acquittal and the decision cost is according to the
C-juror. The expected cost is analogous for an A-juror given that the opponent plays according
to ¿C
5Notice that in case of disagreement at time-zero each player acquires relevant information about the opponents
type, i.e. the support of that is restricted to either the lower `half' or the upper `half' of [p;p] µ [0;1]. Therefore










Again, the ¯rst part refers to states when the C-juror gives in earlier so the verdict is acquittal
and the decision cost is determined by the stopping time of the C-juror. The second part gives
the expected costs if the opponent gives in later so the verdict is conviction and the decision cost
is according to the A-juror. Finally, we can state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1 For any strategy of the opponent the best response exists and is monotone.
Proof See the appendix. ¤
Corollary All equilibria, if any, are in monotone strategies.
3.3 Existence of Equilibrium
Having monotonicity, the sets Â(i);¸(i) = are intervals so we can conveniently refer to strate-
gies by an in¯nite vector containing endpoints of those intervals. Let x be a vector where
xn = inffxj¿A(x) · ng if there is some n0 > n such that ¿A(x) = n0 and xn = 0 otherwise. Simi-
larly, for a C-juror a strategy is represented by y where yn = supfyj¿C(y) · ng if there is some
n0 > n such that ¿C(y) = n0 and yn = 1 otherwise (see, for a similar construction, Athey (2001)).
Later we will refer elements of these vectors as `indi®erent types'. It is useful to emphasize that
Â(i) = [xi;xi¡2];¸(i) = [yi¡2;yi] and Â+(i) = [0;xi] decreasing set and ¸+(i) = [yi;1] increasing
set. Notice that x does not specify behavior for the cuto® type, but since there is no atom in the
distribution of types this will not a®ect the best response of the opponent. The following graph
helps to understand this construction (recall that · denoted the cuto® type at time-zero):
0 1 ·
y2 y4 x1 x3 x5
| {z }
stops after period 5
| {z }
stops at or before period 5
To prove existence we would like to apply a ¯xed point theorem for the best response corre-
spondence. The problem arises; however, that the strategy space is in¯nite (i.e. the vectors
6representing strategies are in¯nite dimensional) and does not satisfy the conditions of Kakutani's
Theorem. Instead, we will use Schauder's Fixed Point Theorem to prove existence of monotone
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There is an equilibrium in monotone strategies.
Proof See the appendix. ¤
4 Characterization
In the previous section we argued that there is equilibrium in monotone strategies, now we want
to step further and describe the nature of this equilibrium. We aim to estimate the length of
deliberation, i.e. the length of time elapses before the conclusion is made. What we ¯nd matches
with Coase Conjecture type results, that as the time-interval shrinks the delay vanishes too.
This result leans on monotonicity, implying that the longer the deliberation, the stronger
the opponent's private information. Hence, after each period a juror can `learn' about the the
lowest possible type of the opponent. We show that equilibrium strategies must be `embedded'
in the sense that types whose private information o®sets each other should give in in consecutive
periods. Intuitively, there is no reason to hold out if it is sure that the opponent has an extreme
signal enough to make her preferred decision better overall. The °ip side of this coin is that
costly deliberation induces jurors to stop before a `su±cient' amount of information is acquired
for doing so. To maintain the equilibrium, each juror should provide enough incentive for the
opponent not to give in too early. This intuition is formalized below.
De¯nition 1 (Signal Strength) A signal x is at least as A-strong as y or x ºs y, if ½(x;y) ·
q. In other words, if x is stronger than y the jurors prefer acquittal ex post.
Notice that equivalence in this ordering gives us the types those are o®setting each other.
We show that in equilibrium the cuto® type at period n cannot be stronger, in the sense of the
de¯nition above, than the one in period n + 1. Not having this, allows for pro¯table deviation,
the indi®erent type at n will strictly prefer to undercut. The argument is the following, waiting
for n + 2 increases both the terminal and decision cost for the juror, so it is strictly dominated.
The following lemma proves this. Since we address the problem of vanishing time periods we
need to extend our notation that indicates this length. The vectors x¢ and y¢ will describe
monotone equilibrium strategies for ¢ period length.
Lemma 1 For any ¢, in equilibrium x¢
n Âs y¢
n¡1 8n 2 Nx and y¢
n Âs x¢
n¡1 8n 2 Ny.
Proof (by contradiction) We only prove that y¢
n Âs x¢
n¡1, the other is similar. Assume y¢
n ¹s
x¢
n¡1 where n 2 Ny and show that a type y¢
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n+1, so for any x 2 [x¢
n¡1;x¢
n+1], ½(x;y¢
n ) · q.
Therefore, the LHS is strictly negative, so y¢
n strictly prefers stopping at n. Contradiction. ¤
To support the previous result, we need a large mass of types giving in each period, for
almost all the periods. To prove this, we will show that the marginal bene¯t for the indi®erent
C-juror is proportional to (x¢
n¡1 ¡ x¢
n+1)2, while the marginal cost is proportional to ¢. Hence,
the indi®erence condition forces x¢
n¡1 ¡ x¢
n+1 to approach zero slower than ¢. Clearly, a similar
argument holds for an A-juror.
















¢ > ® for all ¢ < ¹ ¢, if n 2 Nx and y¢
n+1 < 1 ¡ ´.




n¡1, 8n 2 Ny. So there exists »¢
n 2 (x¢
n+1;x¢
n¡1) such that ½(»¢
n ;y¢
n ) = q. By
the de¯nition of y¢
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The LHS of (1) gives us the marginal bene¯t from waiting, i.e. how much the terminal cost is
decreasing in expectation while the RHS of (1) describes the expected increase in decision cost.
Next, we compare them and ¯nd upper and lower bounds. Notice that for low x, the terminal
cost is actually increasing, so that the marginal bene¯t is negative, while for high x, the opposite
holds. So it seems convenient to separate these e®ects. Using the de¯nition of »¢


























































































< ¹ ½x ¹ f(x¢
n¡1 ¡ »¢
n )2
8where ¯rst we used ½x(x;y) > 0 and then that ½x(x;y) and f(xjy) are bounded above for










> ¢c2 ¹ F
where F is a lower bound for F(xjy) if x;y 2 [´;1 ¡ ´]. Therefore,
¹ ½x ¹ f(x¢
n¡1 ¡ »¢
n )2 > ¢c2 ¹ F:















where A2 = 2c ¹ F
¹ f ¹ ½x > 0. The ¯rst inequality follows by Lemma 1. ¤
Finally, we can prove our main proposition about vanishing delay in decision. Formally, we
will show that by any real time T, the decision has been made by this time with probability near
one if the period length is small enough.
Proposition 3 Fix T > 0 and " > 0. There exists ¢ > 0 such that if N(¢;T) = T=¢ then
jy¢
N ¡ x¢
N¡1j > 1 ¡ 2":
Hence, the decision process ends by time T with probability at least 1 ¡ 2".
Proof (by contradiction) If y¢
N > 1¡", and x¢
N < " then it is obvious. Assume 9 T;" > 0 such
that for all ¢ > 0
jy¢
N ¡ x¢
N¡1j < 1 ¡ 2"
and y¢
N < 1 ¡ " and/or x¢
N¡1 > ". Without loss of generality, assume x¢
N¡1 > ". Then by








for all ¢ < ¢. Therefore, for small enough ¢


















= 1 ¡ 2":
Contradiction. ¤
95 Conclusion
We analyzed costly dynamic voting as a decision making process for committees of two members.
We assumed private information and common interest of the decision makers. Our research
question was whether delay can be explained in deliberation solely by the problems of like minded
individuals trying to communicate their information, but with an inability to do so except by
persistence in voting. We found a negative answer, i.e. if the time interval between votes shrinks,
the real time elapse of the delay vanishes too. Immediate decision is quite counterfactual so
our result suggests that delay in decisions can only be explained by di®erent preferences among
committee members, that is subject of future research.
10A Monotonicity: Proof of Proposition 1
We work out the proof only for C-jurors. To prove that the best response exists and monotone
we will use a theorem by Milgrom and Shannon (1994)6. Recall that f : X £ T ! R has the
single crossing property in (x;t) if for x00 > x0 and t00 > t0, f(x00;t0) ¡ f(x0;t0) > 0 implies that
f(x00;t00) ¡ f(x0;t00) > 0.
Theorem (Milgrom-Shannon) Let g : X £ X ! R, where X ½ R and S ½ X. Then
argmaxs2S g(x;t) is monotone nondecreasing in (t;S) i® g satis¯es the single crossing property
in (x;t).
The theorem states that if the objective function has the single crossing property in choice
variable and type then the optimal action increases in type. Notice that the theorem is stated
for maximization problems but in our model the players are cost minimizers. Hence, we need to
show that the negative expected costs satis¯es the assumption of this theorem. Fix the real-time
elapses between two periods and ¯x a strategy of the opponent. Since we ¯xed the opponent's
strategy we abuse notation and leave out ¿A. Recall the value function for a C-juror of type y,










Hence, the change in value function (decrease in expected costs) for a C-juror of type y who stops












where we used the expressions vA(x;y) = (1 ¡ q)½(x;y) and vC(x;y) = q(1 ¡ ½(x;y)). Changing
the time of stopping changes both the terminal and the decision cost if the opponents realization is
such that ¿A(x) 2 (n;m). First, the terminal cost varies since the verdict changes from acquittal
to conviction, i.e. the costs decreases by vA(x;y) ¡ vC(x;y). Second, the decision cost clearly
increases.
The core of the proof is to realize that the positivity of ¢V implies that it is increasing in
type. In our model we can show that ¢V itself is a lower bound for ¢Vy, so the single crossing
property is implied.
Lemma 3 The ratio fy=f has upper bound.
Proof De¯ne K =
F(·jI)
F(·jG). After some algebra






























Lemma 4 The function Ã(x;y) = [½(x;y) ¡ q]f(xjy) is increasing in y. De¯ne X0(y) ½ [0;1]
so that Ã(x;y) > 0. The ratio of Ãy=Ã has lower bound on X0(y).






















q`(x) + (1 ¡ q)K
y2(1 + K`(y))((1 ¡ q) ¡ q`(x)`(y))
>
(1 ¡ q)K
y2(1 + K`(y))(1 ¡ q)
= C:
¤
Lemma 5 For any n2 > n1, if ¢V (n1;n2;y) > 0 for some y then ¢V (n1;n2;y0) > 0 for any
y0 > y.




















































= C¢V (n;m;y) > 0
¤
Corollary The negative expected costs has the single crossing property in (n;y), so the condition
for Milgrom-Shannon Theorem is satis¯ed. The best response is monotone increasing.
For an A-juror we can repeat the same argument except that we need to rede¯ne the stopping
time n = ¡m and show the single crossing property of the negative expected costs for A in (m;x).
B Existence: Proof of Proposition 2
Theorem (Schauder) If M is a compact, convex and non-empty subset of a Banach space,
and T : M ! M is a continuous mapping, then T has a ¯xed point.7
To complete the proof we have to check whether the conditions for Schauder Theorem are
satis¯ed. Hence, in the rest of the section we need to show an appropriate Banach space of which
the space of monotone strategies is a compact, convex and nonempty subset, as well as to prove
that the best response correspondence is single-valued and continuous in the de¯ned norm.
De¯nition De¯ne the strategy space S ´ X £ Y where8
X ´ fx : N ! [0;1] j x(i) ¸ x(i + 1)g; 8i 2 N
Y ´ fy : N ! [0;1] j y(i) · y(i + 1)g; 8i 2 N:
Lemma 6 There exists a Banach space B such that S ½ B
7See e.g. Granas and Dugundji (2003).
8Alternatively, we can see a strategy as a vector in [0;1]N £ [0;1]N. We are going to alternate these two
interpretations conveniently.
13Proof First, ¯nd the appropriate Banach space. Notice that fN2;2N
2














It is easy to see that jj:jj is a norm and completeness implied by Riesz-Fischer Theorem9. There-
fore, L1(N2) is a Banach space. Finally, the strategy set S ½ L1(N2) since for any s 2 S, jjsjj < 2,
so exists. ¤
Before we proceed to prove the properties of the strategy space we show equivalence between
topologies.
Lemma 7 On S the norm jj:jj implies convergence that is equivalent to pointwise convergence
in Euclidian norm.
Proof Notice that S is a space of bounded functions.
()) Pick i and " > 0 and ¯nd Ni such that 8n > Ni, jzn(i) ¡ z(i)j < ". By convergence in
jj:jj there is N such that 8n > N, jjzn ¡ zjj < "
2i. Then, Ni = N is appropriate since
jzn(i) ¡ z(i)j · 2ijjzn ¡ zjj < 2i "
2i = ":






1¡(1=2)I . By pointwise convergence 8i · I, there is Ni such that 8n > Ni, jzn(i)¡z(i)j <
"I. Then, N = maxfNig is appropriate since



























Lemma 8 The strategy space is convex and compact.
Proof Convexity follows conveniently from the monotonicity of the strategies. Hence, we only
need to show that S is compact. Using the vector interpretation, notice that the strategy space is
the product of [0;1] intervals those are compact in Euclidian norm. Tychonov Theorem10 implies
compactness for the product topology what is equivalent to `our' topology by Lemma 7. ¤
9See e.g. DiBenedetto (2002).
10See e.g. DiBenedetto (2002).
14Before we describe the properties of the best response function we show the continuity of the
expected costs function in type and the opponent's strategy. As usual we work this out only for
a C-juror.
Lemma 9 The expected cost function V (n;y;x) is continuous in y and x.










The continuity in type is obvious since the both the terminal values and the conditional density
are continuous in y. We prove continuity in the opponent's strategy. For an " > 0 we have
to ¯nd appropriate ± such that jjx0 ¡ xjj < ± implies jV (n;y;x0) ¡ V (n;y;x)j < ". Notice that
V (n;y;x0) = V (n;y;x) whenever x0






xi; if i · j
x0
i; otherwise:
Let B an upper bound for [vC(x;y) + n¢c]f(xjy) and [vA(x;y) + n¢c]f(xjy), B exists. Hence,
for any j, jV (n;y; ~ x
j¡1) ¡ V (n;y; ~ x
j)j < 2Bjx0
j ¡ xjj. Then, ± < "
2B2n is appropriate since
jV (n;y;x0) ¡ V (n;y;x)j ·
n X
j=1
jV (n;y; ~ x




















Lemma 10 The best response correspondence BR : S ! S is single valued and continuous.11
Proof BR is single-valued since a generic element of BR(s) is de¯ned by
supfy jV (n;y;x) · V (n + 2;y;x)g
or
inffxjV (n;x;y) · V (n + 2;x;y)g:
To show continuity of the best response we will prove that for two sequences of strategies xk ! x
and yk ! y if yk = BRy(xk) then y = BRy(x). Intuitively, if for some i, yk
i is an indi®erent
type, i.e. V (i;yk
i ;xk) = V (i + 2;yk
i ;xk) then these values should be equal in the limit as well.
11Alternatively BR = BRx £ BRy.
15Assume that there is yi such that jV (i;yi;x) ¡ V (i + 2;yi;x)j = " > 0. By Lemma 9 there ex-
ist N1;N2;N3;N4 such that jV (i;yi;x)¡V (i;yk
i ;x)j < "=4;jV (i;yk
i ;x)¡V (i;yk
i ;xk)j < "=4;jV (i+
2;yk
i ;xk) ¡ V (i + 2;yk
i ;x)j < "=4;jV (i + 2;yk
i ;x) ¡ V (i + 2;yi;x)j < "=4 respectively if k > Ni.
Hence, for k high enough
" = jV (i;yi;x) ¡ V (i + 2;yi;x)j · jV (i;yi;x) ¡ V (i;yk
i ;x)j + jV (i;yk
i ;x) ¡ V (i;yk
i ;xk)j +
jV (i + 2;yk
i ;xk) ¡ V (i + 2;yk
i ;x)j + jV (i + 2;yk














Contradiction. The best response is continuous. ¤
Corollary The conditions of Schauder Theorem hold for the best response function. Hence,
equilibrium exists.
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